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THE BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
Solomon, the eleventh century King of Israel, was credited with great 
wisdom and sense. He was asked to decide which of two women was the 
mother of a child. Obviously in those days medical tests were not available to 
decide the issue. Solomon declared that the only solution would be to divide 
the child in two. The true mother, realising the awful consequences of this 
decision, came forward and declared that the other woman should take the 
child. Solomon knew immediately that she was the true mother and 
accordingly the child was given to her.
1
 The decision of a court with regard to 
relocation is reminiscent of the decision which faced Solomon. It is one of the 
most difficult of family law where decisions are never straightforward. 
Speaking before a committee at the House of Representatives in Australia, 
Diana Bryant stated: 
 
“Relocation cases are the hardest cases that the court does... If you 
read the judgments in almost every judgement… you will see the 
comment that these cases are heart-wrenching, they are difficult and 
they do not allow for an easy answer. Internationally, they pose 
exactly the same problems as they pose in Australia. I have heard 
them described as cases which pose a dilemma rather than a problem. 
A problem can be solved: a dilemma is insoluble…”2 
 
                                                   
 LLB, LLM (London), Barrister, Reader in Law, the University of Buckingham. 
1 See the Old Testament 1 Kings 3:16-28. 
2 The Hon Diana Bryant speaking before the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee (Australia) on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Report on the Exposure 
Draft of the Family law amendment (shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 in 
August 2005 p 22. 
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Where a parent who has a residence order for a child requests leave from 
the court to relocate to another country the implications on contact with that 
child for the other parent are manifold. If both parents have a shared residence 
order then the issue of relocation becomes even more complex and difficult to 
decide. Even the wisdom of Solomon would be sorely tested in such cases. 
There are a whole host of issues for the court to unravel, not least to examine 
carefully the reasons why relocation is sought. In Re AR (A Child: 
Relocation)
3
 Mostyn J commented that whilst accepting that great weight 
should be placed on the psychological impact of refusal to leave on the parent 
who is the primary carer, paradoxically it appeared to penalise selflessness 
and virtue whilst rewarding selfishness and uncontrolled emotions. In these 
cases the court has to be ever mindful of the reasons why a parent wishes to 
object to the relocation of a child. Thorpe LJ suggested in Payne v Payne
4
 that 
there must be careful appraisal of the opposition of the other parent. Is it 
motivated by genuine concern for the future of the child‟s welfare or is it 
driven by some ulterior motive?
5
 The inevitable emotive nature of the 
arguments of each party can cloud the issue. 
Under s 13(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, a child cannot be removed 
from the United Kingdom for longer than one month whilst there is a 
residence order in force without written consent of every person with parental 
responsibility or with leave of the court. Where leave of the court is sought, 
the welfare of the child will be the paramount consideration.
6
 The underlying 
difficulty in these cases lies in the fact that the welfare of the child may be 
equally affected by the improved well-being of the parent with residence if 
granted permission to relocate and by the reduction in contact with the non-
resident parent. The decision on relocation therefore involves amongst other 
issues a careful balancing act between these two considerations. 
The recent decision in K v K
7
 has given the courts the chance to review the 
law on relocation of a parent and to decide whether previous cases, in acting 
in the best interests of the child have placed too great emphasis on the needs 
of the parent wishing to relocate. The case concerned an application by the 
mother of two children, aged four and two to relocate with the children from 
the United Kingdom to Canada, the country of her birth. A shared residence 
order had been granted and care had been shared between the parents since 
the birth of the children, so relocation to Canada would mean that the children 
would see their father at best three or four times a year. Since 2001 relocation 
                                                   
3 [2010] 2 FLR 1577. 
4 [2001] EWCA Civ 166. 
5 Ibid, at para 40. 
6 Children Act 1989, s 1(1). 
7
 [2011] EWCA 793. 
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applications have been subject to principles laid down in Payne v Payne
8
 and 
that decision came under close scrutiny in K v K. The decision in Payne has 
been the subject considerable academic and judicial criticism for its limited 
approach to challenges by a parent against an application by a primary carer 
to relocate abroad.
9
 Such criticism was summed up in 2010 by Wall LJ in Re 
D (Leave to Remove; Appeal) 
 
“There has been considerable criticism of Payne v Payne in certain 
quarters, and there is a perfectly respectable argument for the 
proposition that it places too great an emphasis on the wishes and 
feelings of the relocating parent, and ignores or relegates the harm 
done to children by a permanent breach of the relationship which 
children have with the parent left behind.”10 
 
PAYNE V PAYNE 
 
Payne v Payne concerned a child aged four who lived with her mother 
after the relationship of her parents had broken down. The child had had 
regular contact with her father. She spent a little under half her time with him 
in any two month cycle. The judge
11
 accepted that the child had a very good 
relationship with the father and her paternal grandmother and extended family 
and spent considerable time with them all. The mother wished to relocate to 
New Zealand to live closer to her family. She felt isolated and depressed 
living in London and she did not like the area where she lived which she felt 
to be unsafe because of its high incidence of crime. The few friends and 
family members that she had all lived some distance away. The judge granted 
leave to the mother to relocate to New Zealand with the child. He applied the 
earlier decision in Poel v Poel
12
 which held that leave should generally be 
granted where the mother‟s proposal to relocate is genuine, practical and 
reasonable and not a surreptitious attempt to cut off the father‟s contact with 
the child. Sachs LJ had stated in Poel: 
 
“When a marriage breaks up, a situation normally arises when the 
child of that marriage, instead of being in the joint custody of both 
parents, must of necessity become one who is in the custody of a 
                                                   
8 See above n 4. 
9 See generally J Herring and R Taylor “Relocating Relocation” [2006] Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 517 and M Hayes “Relocation Cases: Is the Court of Appeal 
Applying the Correct Principles?” [2006] Child and Family Law Quarterly 351. 
10 [2010] EWCA Civ 50. 
11 His Honour Judge Langan sitting in the Cambridge County Court. 
12
 [1970] 1 WLR 1469. 
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single parent. Once that position has arisen and the custody is working 
well, this court should not lightly interfere with such a reasonable way 
of life as is selected by that parent to whom custody has been rightly 
given.”13 
 
The effect of the decision in Payne on the father‟s future contact with the 
child was quite devastating. Although the father could afford the airfare to 
New Zealand several times a year he would no longer have the day to day 
care which he had previously enjoyed. He appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
He argued that a presumption had been created in the case law in favour of the 
primary carer which was impossible for a father to overcome because it was 
based on the established principle that a request by the primary carer to 
relocate would be granted unless the court concluded that it was incompatible 
with the welfare of the child. He argued that this was inconsistent with 
principles under the Children Act 1989 as it failed to place sufficient 
importance on maintaining contact with the absent parent and it was 
incompatible with the father‟s rights under the Human Rights Act 1989. The 
Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that the recognition and 
support given to the primary carer did not amount to a legal presumption. It 
held that the Human Rights Act 1998 had not required a revision of the 
judicial approach in cases of relocation because the welfare of the child 
remained paramount in spite of the fact that there may be some conflict with 
the rights of adults.
14
  
Such a limited approach to human rights issues has since been criticised.
15
 
Stephen Gilmore commented that the approach of the Court of Appeal in this 
case fails to acknowledge the difference between the paramountcy principle 
(in which the focus is solely on the child) and the wider principles within 
Article 8
16
 where the paramountcy principle is displaced.
17
 Andrew Bainham 
also criticised the approach of the Court of Appeal
18
 in Payne and its failure to 
address the issue of continuing contact of the father with the child. He cited 
Article 9(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
which provides that States parties must:  
 
                                                   
13 Ibid, at 1473. 
14 See above n 4 Thorpe LJ, at para [82]. 
15 See generally J Herring and R Taylor above n 9 and S Gilmore “The Payne Saga: 
Precedent and Family Law Cases” [2011] Family Law 970. 
16 Article 8 ECHR Right to respect for private and family life: 1. Everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
17 See Gilmore above n 15, at 977. 
18 A Bainham “Taking Children Abroad: human rights, welfare and the courts” [2001] 
Cambridge Law Journal 489 at 492. 
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“respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both 
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both 
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child‟s best 
interests” 
 
and observed that it was regrettable that the Court of Appeal did not address 
the question of continuing contact between the father and the child with 
greater urgency in the light of these international obligations. 
Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss set out the considerations
19
 that should be in 
the forefront of the mind of a judge trying a case concerning relocation: 
 
(a) The welfare of the child is always paramount; 
(b)  There is no presumption created by s 13(1)(b) in favour of the 
applicant parent; 
(c) The reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing 
to live abroad carry great weight; 
(d) Consequently the proposals have to be scrutinised with care and the 
court needs to be satisfied that there is a genuine motivation for the 
move and not the intention to bring contact with the other parent to an 
end; 
(e) The effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent 
and in some cases his family is very important; 
(f) The opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the 
parent left behind may be very significant.  
 
Although she was at pains to emphasise that there was no presumption in 
favour of the parent applying for relocation, the decision in Payne left any 
parent challenging a claim to relocate with little hope of success. Indeed 
Dame Butler-Sloss held that a reasonable proposal made by the applicant 
parent, the refusal of which would have adverse consequences upon the 
stability of her new family and therefore an adverse effect upon the welfare of 
the child would continue to be a factor of great weight.
20
 
The vast majority of cases decided in the years following Payne upheld 
the application of the parent seeking to relocate. In spite of  critical comments 
made by Wall LJ in Re D (Leave to Remove; Appeal)
21
 the application by a 
father for leave to appeal a decision by the county court granting leave to 
remove the children from the jurisdiction was refused because the judge 
declared that the appeal would stand no reasonable prospect of success. 
Likewise the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of a father challenging the 
                                                   
19 See above n 4, at para [85]. 
20 See above n 4, at para [84]. 
21
 See above n 10. 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 182 
decision of the county court in Re H (Leave to Remove)
22
 allowing a mother 
to relocate to the Czech Republic refusing to review the guidelines laid down 
in Payne. The court held that on the facts this was a clear case for the grant of 
permission to relocate, irrespective of the binding guidance given by Payne, 
by reference simply to the welfare of the child. Where leave to relocate was 
refused, refusal was based on the welfare of the child. Leave was refused in 
Re Y (Leave to remove from Jurisdiction)
23
 where an American mother sought 
the right to return to America with her child who lived equally with her and 
his Welsh father. Hedley J held that relocation would be disruptive to the 
child. This child had become integrated into the culture of Wales to such an 
extent that he spoke Welsh. He accepted that refusal to grant the order would 
affect the mother but in refusing leave he explained:  
 
“…in reaching a decision in this case I have tried to focus on Y‟s 
welfare and to postpone the interests of both the parents, however fair 
and reasonable, to that one consideration. It truly is a case in which 
the paramountcy of the child‟s welfare has led to one parent being 
dealt a crushing disappointment...”24 
 
Earlier in his judgment Hedley J had assessed the overall impact on the 
mother of a refusal to grant leave: 
 
“….his mother – even though she is free to go as she pleases – will 
doubtless stay in Wales, but equally doubtless will remain feeling 
isolated, distressed and frustrated in circumstances where all those 
feelings may intensify over time, depending on how things works out. 
And of course all that may have consequences for Y, not only in terms 
of the quality of care he receives from the mother but in the sense of 
being exposed to her continued unhappiness, and those are real issues 
when I have serious regard, as I do, to the emotional welfare of this 
child…”25 
 
THE FACTS OF K V K 
 
K v K concerned an application by the mother of two children for leave to 
relocate to Canada. Both parents had come to England from Canada as adults. 
The mother was Canadian and the father was Polish although he had spent his 
early years in Canada. The parties met at the University of Toronto in 1992. 
                                                   
22 [2010] EWCA 915. 
23 [2004] 2 FLR 330. 
24 Ibid, at para [24]. 
25
 Ibid, at para [11]. 
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They came to England and eventually married in 2004 and within five years 
they had had two daughters, the first daughter „I‟ born in 2006 and „A‟ born in 
2009. Both parents were employed in the banking world. Soon after the birth 
of A the relationship broke down, the parties separated and divorce 
proceedings were filed in 2010. Both parents were involved with their care 
and both had reduced employment hours in order to enable this. A shared 
residency order was made in August 2010, the effect of which was that the 
two children spent five nights with their father and nine nights with their 
mother over the period of a fortnight. In January 2011 the mother made an 
application to relocate with the children to Canada. She argued that her health 
and well-being was suffering whilst she remained in England and she missed 
the support of her family. There was evidence that both parties that they were 
suffering from stress and depression at the time of the hearing before the court 
at first instance. 
 
THE DECISION AT FIRST INSTANCE 
 
The case for the mother rested on her isolation and unhappiness whilst she 
remained in England. Medical evidence from her doctor showed that she 
suffered from depression and stress for which she received medication. She 
wished to return to Canada where she had a supportive family, indeed if she 
were to be allowed to relocate to Canada she intended to live with her parents. 
The father argued that he had great commitment to his family and he had 
genuinely shared in the children‟s care. Evidence was presented by the 
Cafcass officer who emphasised that the judge needed to weigh the balance 
between the detriment to the children if they remained and the detriment that 
would result from a diminished relationship with their father.
26
 The Cafcass 
officer concluded that the balance came down against the move and 
recommended the refusal of the application. The judge found for the mother 
in spite of the strong recommendation from the Cafcass officer that her 
application should be refused. The judge placed great weight on the potential 
effect of refusal on the mother: 
 
“…..Importantly, I have to consider the effect on the mother and, 
consequently, upon the children of a refusal of her application. In my 
judgment she would feel increasingly isolate and depressed, which 
would be damaging for the children….If the mother were required to 
remain in London where I am satisfied she has not been happy in 
recent times, her distress is highly likely to increase with 
consequential impact on the girls‟ welfare….”27 
                                                   
26 See above n 7 at para [22]. 
27
 See above n 7, at para [33]. 
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THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The father appealed on three grounds: 
 
i) The judge rejected the recommendation of the Cafcass officer 
without proper analysis and explanation;  
ii) The judge directed herself by reference to the guidance offered by 
Dame Butler-Sloss P at paragraph 85 in Payne v Payne (guidance 
apt for applications by primary carers) rather than by reference to 
the decision of Hedley J in Re Y (Leave to Remove from 
Jurisdiction)
28
 (the only authority then available directly 
considering a relocation application by a parent who shared the 
care of his child) 
iii) In explaining her conclusion the judge referred only to the case 
that the mother presented. Even when that deficit was raised by 
Ms Bazley,
29
 she had not remedied the defect by referring to the 
case presented by the father.
30
  
 
Thorpe LJ concluded that the court should find in favour of the father. He 
considered the grounds of appeal and upheld the applicant on all three 
grounds. Firstly, he reflected that the views of the Cafcass officer had not 
been given sufficient weight. He held that the judge had not explained why 
she did not give effect to the clear recommendation that the mother‟s 
application should be refused.
31
 Secondly, he accepted that it was not 
appropriate to apply Payne v Payne to cases where the applicant shares the 
care of the children more or less equally with the respondent as in this case. 
He held that there had been a misdirection in law by the judge at first 
instance:  
 
“…Given the extent to which the father was providing daily care, the 
judge should have considered and applied the dicta of Hedley J in Re 
Y rather than those of the President in Payne…”32 
 
In spite of arguments on behalf of the mother that care had been shared in 
Payne v Payne since the children were shown to be in the care of their father 
                                                   
28 See above n 23.  
29 Miss Janet Bazley QC Counsel who appeared for the father in the court at first 
instance. 
30 See above n 7, at para [25]. 
30 See above n 7, at para [25]. 
31 Ibid, at paras [31-32]. 
32
 See above n 7 at para [35]. 
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for 40% of the time Lord Justice Thorpe held that different principles should 
apply where there is a shared residence order as opposed to shared care 
between a primary and secondary carer.
33
 Thirdly, he addressed the final 
grounds of appeal by concluding that the judge ignored a range of factors that 
should have been brought into consideration when deciding the issue. He 
concluded that:  
 
“…her conclusion is not the result of a balancing of pros and cons. 
She lists only the pros upon which she pronounces her conclusion. 
That is, in my judgment, a fatal deficit…” 
 
The judgment of Moore-Bick LJ is significant not least for the fact that on 
his own admission he had little familiarity with family law and practice. This 
gave his judgment particular weight since he was considering the case law 
from a new perspective. He considered a range of recent cases on relocation 
starting with Payne pointing out that its facts were less complicated than those 
of K v K as in Payne the mother was the sole carer of the child although the 
child spent extended periods with the father. He suggested that the case 
should be read and understood in the particular context in which it was given. 
His comments on the use of Payne v Payne as an authority in subsequent 
cases is useful and suggests that subsequent courts have failed to distinguish 
between legal principle and guidance. He held that: 
 
“…having considered Payne v Payne itself and the authorities in 
which it has been discussed, I cannot help thinking that the 
controversy which now surrounds it is the result of a failure to 
distinguish clearly between legal principle and guidance… As I read it 
the only principle of law enunciated in Payne v Payne is that the 
welfare of the child is paramount; all the rest is guidance. Such 
difficulty as has arisen is the result of treating that guidance as if it 
contained principles of law from which no departure is permitted….”34 
 
He continued by suggesting that courts may have adopted an “unduly 
mechanistic application of the guidance given in Payne v Payne” and it was 
this approach that had given rise to current concern. He too upheld the father‟s 
appeal. 
The third judge, Black LJ found for the father but took a different route in 
her judgment from Thorpe LJ and Moore-Bick LJ. She suggested that “the 
effect of the guidance from Payne must not be overstated.”35 She argued that 
                                                   
33 Ibid, at paras [28-29]. 
34 Ibid, at para [86]. 
35
 See above n 7, at para [143]. 
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relocation cases should not rest on whether or not a child spent a certain 
amount of time with the non-resident parent or “other aspects of the care 
arrangements”. In her view when cases concerning the relocation of a child 
were considered by a court she expected not:  
 
“…to find cases bogged down with arguments as to whether the time 
spent with each of the parents or other aspects of the care 
arrangements are such as to make the case “a Payne case” or “a Re Y 
case” nor would I expect preliminary skirmishes over the label to be 
applied to the child‟s arrangements with a view to a parent having a 
shared residence order in his or her armoury for deployment in the 
event of a relocation application…. when a relocation case falls to be 
determined, all of the facts need to be considered...”36 
 
COMMENTARY 
 
K v K is an important case on the development of the principles on which 
the courts act in relocation cases. An important fact in this case was that a 
shared residency order had been made. All three judges in the Court of Appeal 
referred to this although Lady Black was anxious to note that all the facts of 
the case should be considered in relocation cases and too much emphasis 
should not be placed on whether there was shared care or not. In her view 
cases should not turn on whether the case fell into a group she referred to as 
“a Re Y case” or “a Payne case”. However it is clear that the fact that the 
parties had shared residence in K v K had made a difference to the way the 
Court of Appeal approached the issue. Ultimately the court held that it would 
not be in the children‟s best interests if the mother were to be granted the right 
to relocate because this would undermine the regular contact that the father 
had with his children which would be destroyed and replaced by intermittent 
visits to Canada. This had to be balanced against the reasons for the 
application of the mother. The court accepted that her application to return to 
Canada was for genuine medical reasons but balanced against the need for the 
children to maintain regular contact with the father the court decided it was in 
the best interests of the children to remain in England. Thorpe LJ 
commentedon the failure of the judge to give sufficient weight to the care 
provided by the father: 
 
“…I am in no doubt that that is a misdirection as to the law. Given the 
extent to which the father was providing daily care, the judge should 
have considered and applied the dicta of Hedley J in Re Y (Leave to 
                                                   
36
 Ibid, at para [145]. 
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Remove from Jurisdiction) rather than those of the President in 
Payne…”37  
 
In Re Y the court was presented with evidence of the mother‟s feelings 
and sense of isolation and the effect on her health of continuing to live in 
Wales. As in K v K this constituted one of the main reasons for her wish to 
relocate to America but Hedley J balanced these factors against what he 
perceived as the best interests of the child.  
The court is bound by the welfare principle in relocation cases and what 
the court perceives to be the best interests of the child but as many 
practitioners and academics
38
 have pointed out there is little real research on 
what is the best interest of a child who is caught in the middle of a relocation 
dispute.
39
 Research is difficult because of the problem of deciding on the 
correct comparators. As pointed out by Rob George “the difficulty is that the 
findings risk comparing apples with oranges”.40 He suggests that comparisons 
made between “children who move” and “children who do not move” uses the 
wrong comparator. Instead the correct comparison is between “children who 
move where one parent applied to court unsuccessfully to prevent the move” 
and “children who do not move where one parent applied to court 
unsuccessfully to be allowed to move”. He continues “a comparison which 
includes all children who move or who do not move is irrelevant to the 
relocation debate, because it brings into the equation a great many children 
whose parents never wish to relocate, and children whose parents did not 
litigate in opposition to the relocation plans.”41 There is little research on how 
a child fares after a court has refused permission to relocate to a parent. Some 
weight may be placed on findings from research in the United States although 
this research focuses primarily on interstate relocation as opposed to 
international relocation. William Austin evaluated research findings in the 
United States
42
 and concluded that children of divorced parents who relocate 
                                                   
37 Ibid, at para [35]. 
38 M Freeman “Relocation Research: Where Are We Now?” (2011) International 
Family Law 131; M Freeman “The Reunite Research Project” (2010) International 
Family Law 161. 
39 Note the research project conducted by M Freeman in 2009 “Relocation: the 
Reunite Research”. Research Unit of the Reunite International Child Abduction 
Centre as one of the few examples of research in this area.  
40 R George “Reviewing Relocation? Re W (relocation: Removal outside jurisdiction) 
[2011] EWCA Civ 345 and K v K (Relocation: Shared Care Arrangements) [2011] 
EWCA Civ 793” [2012] Child and Family Law Quarterly 108. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See generally W Austin “Relocation, Research and Forensic Evaluation, Part 1 
Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce” (2008) Family Court Review 
137. 
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seem to fare less well in a number of respects such as education and social 
well being. He cites research from Tucker in 1998 which showed that children 
of divorce who move only one time increase their chances of having problems 
at school by forty per cent.
43
 However Austin prefaces his article by stating 
that although the research he reviews shows that there is convincing evidence 
that relocation significantly expands the level of risk for children of divorce, 
the literature should not be viewed as creating a basis for a bias or legal 
presumption against relocation.
44
 He suggests that to conclude that a child‟s 
education may be affected by relocation is only part of the discussion in 
contested relocation disputes and does not necessarily address the issue of the 
break in contact with the other parent, perhaps simply a case of comparing 
“oranges with apples”45 and concentrating more on the general effect of 
divorce than the more contentious effect of relocation. The lack of research in 
the United Kingdom is being currently addressed by a research project which 
aims to review every relocation case heard in any family court in England and 
Wales during 2012.
46
 
If the effect of K v K is to be that the courts will look at the facts of cases 
of shared residency differently from those of sole residency then a further 
question for research should be the merits of shared residency and its effect on 
children. Shared care may arise in cases of sole residency which may amount 
to as much time being spent with the children by the non-resident carer as in 
shared residency cases. There is little research on this in the United Kingdom 
so conclusions must be drawn from studies in Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States. A review of the research by Liz Trinder in 2010 considered a 
number of aspects of shared care such as the level of satisfaction for both 
parents and children, the length of time that shared care genuinely lasted and 
whether shared care could be perceived as “good for children”.47 She cites one 
major study of school age children undertaken by McIntosh et al
48
 in Australia 
which, amongst a number of issues, considered children‟s satisfaction with 
shared care arrangements. The study concluded that arrangements for equal or 
substantial sharing of time may in some circumstances suit parents better than 
                                                   
43 C J Tucker, J Marx and L Long “„Moving on‟: Residential Mobility and Children‟s 
School Lives” (1998) Sociology of Education 71. 
44 See above n 42, at 137. 
45 Ibid. 
46 The Relocation Research Project 2012 under Dr Rob George, authorised by Sir 
Nicholas Wall P under FPR rule 10.73(c): see Family Law Week 13/04/2012. 
47 L Trinder “Shared Residence: A Review of Recent Research Evidence” [2010] 
Family Law 1192. 
48 J McIntosh, B Smyth, M Kelaher, Y Wells and C Long  (eds) Post-Separation 
Parenting Arrangements and Developmental Outcomes for Infants and Children. 
Three Reports Prepared for the Australian Government Attorney-General’s 
Department (Canberra: 2010). 
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the children. The key messages drawn from research by Liz Trinder are two-
fold. Firstly, that children should have far more influence over arrangements 
for their care and secondly, that the focus of apportioning time between the 
parents reflects an adult agenda rather than a child agenda. She writes:  
 
“…If it were children who made the applications or decided cases or 
redesigned the family justice system, then it is likely that most would 
want to refocus the attention of adults on the quality rather than the 
quantity of relationships….”49  
 
Children‟s views are a relevant issue under the Children Act 1989.50 The 
welfare checklist includes the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the 
children in the light of their age and understanding and so the court must 
consider their views where appropriate. The views of the children in the 
recent case of C v D 
51
were an important issue and influenced the outcome of 
the application for the mother to relocate to the United States. In this case the 
children were aged thirteen and eight, it is more difficult where the children 
are younger. The children in Payne and K v K were very young so their views 
were difficult to ascertain although the evidence of the Cafcass officer on the 
effect of relocation on the children‟s relationship with their father proved 
influential in the Court of Appeal decision in K v K.  
The decision in relocation case is an almost impossible choice to make for 
any court and it is reminiscent of the decision of Solomon in finding the 
mother of the child. He took a risk in making his decision. In retrospect it 
turned out to the right decision. The problem today is that without 
understanding the true effect of either granting or refusing an order to relocate 
the court cannot be confident that the decision has been made in the best 
interests of the child and so relocation cases continue to involve an element of 
risk. 
                                                   
49 See above n 47, at p 1197. 
50 S 1(3) ....a court shall have regard in particular to – (a) the ascertainable wishes and 
feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding). 
51
 [2011] EWHC 335 (Fam). 
